Low-skilled employees in construction sites of Male’ and several islands such as L. Gan as well as resort construction sites are commonly provided with substandard living conditions, including overcrowded apartments or lodging in unsafe and unhygienic ‘labour quarters’ often lacking adequate light, potable water, and adequate cooking and bathing facilities.
Labour quarters need to be cleaned up with the introduction of national standards, spot checks and possibly fines, and force employers into improving their labour record.
Worldwide, rats and mice spread over 35 diseases. Rodent-borne diseases are spread directly to humans through bite wounds, consuming food or water that is contaminated with rodent feces, coming in contact with surface water contaminated with rodent urine, or through breathing in germs that may be present in rodent urine or droppings that have been stirred into the air (a process known as “aerosolization”). Diseases from rodents are also spread indirectly to humans by way of ticks, mites, and fleas that transmit the infection to humans after feeding on infected rodents. In some cases, the rodents are the reservoirs (carriers) of the diseases, while in other cases the ticks, mites, or fleas act as the disease reservoirs.
Thursday, March 5, 2009
Monday, February 16, 2009
Toxoplasmosis in Maldives
How do we get Toxoplasmosis?
It can cause severe illness and blindness .
The most common mode of infection is through consumption of food and drinks contaminated with the bug. In the Maldivian context, cats are probably the main animal host. Infected cats excrete Toxoplasma bug in their feces. Certain birds may also get infected and pass the bug in their fecal droppings. Common path ways of infection:
1. Rain water collected from roof tops contaminated with cat feces and bird dropping.
2. Household pets such as cats, poor personal hygiene after handling the pet and after cleaning its litter may contaminate food and ingestion of the disease causing bug.
3. Infected pregnant woman passes the infection through the placenta to the unborn child
4. Infected cats excrete Toxoplasma bug in their feces. Certain birds may also get infected and pass the bug in their fecal droppings.
It can cause severe illness and blindness .
The most common mode of infection is through consumption of food and drinks contaminated with the bug. In the Maldivian context, cats are probably the main animal host. Infected cats excrete Toxoplasma bug in their feces. Certain birds may also get infected and pass the bug in their fecal droppings. Common path ways of infection:
1. Rain water collected from roof tops contaminated with cat feces and bird dropping.
2. Household pets such as cats, poor personal hygiene after handling the pet and after cleaning its litter may contaminate food and ingestion of the disease causing bug.
3. Infected pregnant woman passes the infection through the placenta to the unborn child
4. Infected cats excrete Toxoplasma bug in their feces. Certain birds may also get infected and pass the bug in their fecal droppings.
Toxoplasmosis in Maldives
How do we get Toxoplasmosis?
It can cause severe illness and blindness .
The most common mode of infection is through consumption of food and drinks contaminated with the bug. In the Maldivian context, cats are probably the main animal host. Infected cats excrete Toxoplasma bug in their feces. Certain birds may also get infected and pass the bug in their fecal droppings. Common path ways of infection:
1. Rain water collected from roof tops contaminated with cat feces and bird dropping.
2. Household pets such as cats, poor personal hygiene after handling the pet and after cleaning its litter may contaminate food and ingestion of the disease causing bug.
3. Infected pregnant woman passes the infection through the placenta to the unborn child
4. Infected cats excrete Toxoplasma bug in their feces. Certain birds may also get infected and pass the bug in their fecal droppings.
It can cause severe illness and blindness .
The most common mode of infection is through consumption of food and drinks contaminated with the bug. In the Maldivian context, cats are probably the main animal host. Infected cats excrete Toxoplasma bug in their feces. Certain birds may also get infected and pass the bug in their fecal droppings. Common path ways of infection:
1. Rain water collected from roof tops contaminated with cat feces and bird dropping.
2. Household pets such as cats, poor personal hygiene after handling the pet and after cleaning its litter may contaminate food and ingestion of the disease causing bug.
3. Infected pregnant woman passes the infection through the placenta to the unborn child
4. Infected cats excrete Toxoplasma bug in their feces. Certain birds may also get infected and pass the bug in their fecal droppings.
Wednesday, January 21, 2009
POVERTY ELIVIATION
ADB has dedicated itself to a clear and single-minded vision: an Asia and Pacific region free of poverty. All of ADB’s other goals and strategic objectives should contribute to poverty reduction. The Poverty Reduction Strategy sets out the ways in which ADB proposes to pursue this vision.
* Many were bypassed by the growth and transformation that happened in many of the region’s economies
* Economic crises have pitched into poverty thousands who were previously making gains
* Nearly one in four Asians today is poor, surviving on less than $1 per day
The key elements of ADB’s Poverty Reduction Strategy:
* robust, sustained, pro-poor economic growth
* social development, including human development and improvement in the status of women
* better governance
* Many were bypassed by the growth and transformation that happened in many of the region’s economies
* Economic crises have pitched into poverty thousands who were previously making gains
* Nearly one in four Asians today is poor, surviving on less than $1 per day
The key elements of ADB’s Poverty Reduction Strategy:
* robust, sustained, pro-poor economic growth
* social development, including human development and improvement in the status of women
* better governance
water economics
Economics offers powerful decision and management tools that help to:
* Measure the costs and benefits from water and sanitation investments and policies;
* Assess demand for water and wastewater services and evaluate their relationship to price, income, and other variables;
* Inform decisions regarding the use and targeting of public subsidies, and how to reform tariffs and improve utility finances;
* Evaluate sanitation alternatives and their tradeoffs (choosing, for example, between on-site and off-site systems);
* Assess the costs and benefits of water demand management options, including pricing, leakage reduction, and metering;
* Evaluate the desirability and feasibility of intra- or inter-sectoral water reallocation;
* Assess the efficiency of various modes of service provision (e.g. public vs. private, centralized vs. decentralized);
* Design regulatory and legal frameworks for private sector participation; and
* Evaluate the impact of project or reform on the different actors and stakeholders and devise ways to strengthen institutional frameworks.
* Measure the costs and benefits from water and sanitation investments and policies;
* Assess demand for water and wastewater services and evaluate their relationship to price, income, and other variables;
* Inform decisions regarding the use and targeting of public subsidies, and how to reform tariffs and improve utility finances;
* Evaluate sanitation alternatives and their tradeoffs (choosing, for example, between on-site and off-site systems);
* Assess the costs and benefits of water demand management options, including pricing, leakage reduction, and metering;
* Evaluate the desirability and feasibility of intra- or inter-sectoral water reallocation;
* Assess the efficiency of various modes of service provision (e.g. public vs. private, centralized vs. decentralized);
* Design regulatory and legal frameworks for private sector participation; and
* Evaluate the impact of project or reform on the different actors and stakeholders and devise ways to strengthen institutional frameworks.
Sunday, January 18, 2009
Municipal Sewage Regulation
The Municipal Sewage Regulation shall apply to all discharges of domestic sewage.
The Municipal Sewage Regulation may be developed by the ministry of Transportation, Environement and Water to provide clear and effective requirements for (soon to be local governments) and private utilites (soon to be) sewage dischargers in order to protect public health and the environment. Compliance with the regulation would provide authorization (with minimum standards and requirements) for the treatment, reuse and discharge of domestic sewage, wastewater or municipal liquid waste.
The Ministry of Environment may review and potentially revise the Municipal Sewage Regulation. The review process may follows a policy of "continuous improvement" and the ministry's commitment to review the regulation on a regular basis and revise its provisions as appropriate.
The Municipal Sewage Regulation may be developed by the ministry of Transportation, Environement and Water to provide clear and effective requirements for (soon to be local governments) and private utilites (soon to be) sewage dischargers in order to protect public health and the environment. Compliance with the regulation would provide authorization (with minimum standards and requirements) for the treatment, reuse and discharge of domestic sewage, wastewater or municipal liquid waste.
The Ministry of Environment may review and potentially revise the Municipal Sewage Regulation. The review process may follows a policy of "continuous improvement" and the ministry's commitment to review the regulation on a regular basis and revise its provisions as appropriate.
Wednesday, December 24, 2008
Corrupt Practices during Pre-Qualification and Tendering Phase
The following are some examples of the circumstances in which bribes could be paid during the prequalification and tendering phase.
a) A bidder which is properly qualified may find itself being rejected at pre-qualification stage as a result of a bribe paid to a representative of the owner or engineer by another bidder. The reasons given for rejection would be artificial. Alternatively, no reasons may be given. The rejection of several potential winners could result in the favoured bidder being given an unfair advantage at
tender stage.
b) There may be, in relation to a project at tender stage, confidential details such as the owner’s minimum and maximum acceptable prices, or tender assessment system. Possession of this information may assist a contractor in its bid. The leaking of this information by a representative of the owner or engineer to the favoured bidder in return for a bribe may therefore give it an unfair
advantage.
c) The tenders may be received by the owner and not be opened at a public opening exercise. In this case, no-one except the owner will be aware of the bidders’ prices and other critical tender components. This secrecy will enable a representative of the owner to provide confidential information to the favoured bidder in return for a bribe. This bidder can then amend its tender (for example by dropping its price) so as to secure a winning position. The tenders can then be publicised, and the favoured bidder announced as the winner, and no-one will be aware that the winning bidder was given the secret opportunity to amend its tender.
d) The tender process may be corrupted by international pressure. For example, during an allegedly competitive tender process, the government of a developed country may influence the government of a developing country to make sure that a company from the developed country is awarded a project, even if it is not the cheapest or best option. Such pressure can take many forms, including the offer of aid, arms deals or agreements to support a government’s application to join an international organisation. Great lengths are taken to conceal this pressure in some cases. In
others, it is remarkably overt.
The following are some examples of fraudulent practices during the pre-qualification and tendering phase.
a) The bidders may secretly collude with each other to share the market. This normally entails the bidders agreeing that each one of them will win a certain number of projects, or a certain amount of turnover, in a particular sector. In respect of each project, a winning bidder will be pre-selected secretly by all the bidders, and the other bidders will put in tenders at a price which is higher than that of the pre-selected bidder.
b) The bidders may agree with each other on a “losers’ fee” arrangement. This normally entails the bidders agreeing that they will bid in full competition with each other (i.e. no price fixing agreement, or pre-selection of the winner). However, they agree that they will each include in their price a fixed sum representing the estimated aggregate bid costs of all the bidders. The winner will then divide this fixed sum equally between the losers. The primary reason for this arrangement is compensation for the irrecoverable bidding costs of the losing bidders.
c) A group of suppliers of materials may collude to fix the minimum price of the materials they supply. Even when there is competitive tendering, prices will be kept higher than would be the case with genuine competition.
a) A bidder which is properly qualified may find itself being rejected at pre-qualification stage as a result of a bribe paid to a representative of the owner or engineer by another bidder. The reasons given for rejection would be artificial. Alternatively, no reasons may be given. The rejection of several potential winners could result in the favoured bidder being given an unfair advantage at
tender stage.
b) There may be, in relation to a project at tender stage, confidential details such as the owner’s minimum and maximum acceptable prices, or tender assessment system. Possession of this information may assist a contractor in its bid. The leaking of this information by a representative of the owner or engineer to the favoured bidder in return for a bribe may therefore give it an unfair
advantage.
c) The tenders may be received by the owner and not be opened at a public opening exercise. In this case, no-one except the owner will be aware of the bidders’ prices and other critical tender components. This secrecy will enable a representative of the owner to provide confidential information to the favoured bidder in return for a bribe. This bidder can then amend its tender (for example by dropping its price) so as to secure a winning position. The tenders can then be publicised, and the favoured bidder announced as the winner, and no-one will be aware that the winning bidder was given the secret opportunity to amend its tender.
d) The tender process may be corrupted by international pressure. For example, during an allegedly competitive tender process, the government of a developed country may influence the government of a developing country to make sure that a company from the developed country is awarded a project, even if it is not the cheapest or best option. Such pressure can take many forms, including the offer of aid, arms deals or agreements to support a government’s application to join an international organisation. Great lengths are taken to conceal this pressure in some cases. In
others, it is remarkably overt.
The following are some examples of fraudulent practices during the pre-qualification and tendering phase.
a) The bidders may secretly collude with each other to share the market. This normally entails the bidders agreeing that each one of them will win a certain number of projects, or a certain amount of turnover, in a particular sector. In respect of each project, a winning bidder will be pre-selected secretly by all the bidders, and the other bidders will put in tenders at a price which is higher than that of the pre-selected bidder.
b) The bidders may agree with each other on a “losers’ fee” arrangement. This normally entails the bidders agreeing that they will bid in full competition with each other (i.e. no price fixing agreement, or pre-selection of the winner). However, they agree that they will each include in their price a fixed sum representing the estimated aggregate bid costs of all the bidders. The winner will then divide this fixed sum equally between the losers. The primary reason for this arrangement is compensation for the irrecoverable bidding costs of the losing bidders.
c) A group of suppliers of materials may collude to fix the minimum price of the materials they supply. Even when there is competitive tendering, prices will be kept higher than would be the case with genuine competition.
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